Inequality, conflict, and policy: a review of some MICROCON findings

By Frances Stewart

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There are, unfortunately, many types of violence ranging from domestic violence, through criminality, to riots, large scale civil war, international wars and terrorism and genocide. MICROCON research has explored some underlying causes of several types of violence, at national and global levels. Each is the outcome of a complex set of factors, yet in each inequality appears to play an important role. This paper briefly reviews some of the findings, focussing on five types of violence that MICROCON research has investigated – riots in India, ‘routine’ violence in Indonesia, civil wars, genocide, and global tensions and global terrorism. The paper then discusses policy findings that follow from the findings. Section 1 provides an overview of the deadliness of different types of violence. Section 2 considers a range of types of violence and some of the underlying causes and preventative mechanisms. Section 3 discusses policy findings. And section 4 concludes.

I. Types of violence

Not all conflict is violent, and not all violence leads to deaths. Broadly, we can categorise types of violence into:

- Domestic violence, involving assaults and sometimes deaths
- Criminal (non-family) attacks on people and property;
- Routine violence (recurring brawls; vigilantism; mobbing);
- Disturbances/riots (violent protests with a political objective);
- Government violence against civilians, possibly in response to riots
- Civil wars involving the state
- Civil wars not involving the state
- Genocide (which can be difficult to differentiate from civil wars);
Table 1 categorises the major types of violence, in terms of magnitude of deaths. We must emphasise that the data are guesstimates more than accurate figures. The classification of events is itself questionable – for example, whether the state is involved or not; whether some deaths should be classified as homicides or battle deaths (for example, in ‘drug wars’ of Central America). Moreover, the estimates of each kind of death are uncertain. For example, in Indonesia, (Varshney, et al. 2004) estimate deaths during the post-Suharto period by careful analysis of national newspapers. But later research using the same method, but also including local newspapers, produced a much large estimate ((Barron and Sharpe 2008)).

When it comes to estimating indirect deaths, there is even more uncertainty – there is the issue of what to include in this category, and how to estimate the counterfactual, even assuming one has accurate data for what actually happened. Thus in the Congo vastly different estimates of excess deaths from May 2001 to April 2007 have been put forward – ranging from a negative estimate of -0.55m to 2.83 million. Similarly, (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005) show large variations in estimates of the ratio of battle deaths to total war deaths – varying for example from 4 to 15% in the case of the Biafran war in Nigeria. In estimating deaths due to terrorism, much depends on how ‘terrorism’ is defined. The estimates of homicides are also uncertain, and the country coverage is incomplete. No ‘indirect’ deaths are attributed to homicide, but arguably where the rate is high, investment and economic activity generally is likely to be lower, social service provision may be adversely affected as a consequence and hence excess deaths are possible.

Despite these problems, Table 1 is informative. First, we see that direct battle deaths are just a fraction of homicides (6%); however, if we take the upper estimate of the indirect deaths from conflicts, then the total is double that of homicides. Secondly, as interpreted in this data terrorist deaths are high – the upper estimate being two-thirds of the total battle deaths. Much of this is due to Iraq – where deaths could be defined as ‘battle deaths’: excluding Iraq, estimates for 2007 vary between 2,573 and 7,523 making them much lower than battle deaths. Even though genocides don’t occur on a regular basis, the annualised average for 1951 to 2001 far exceeds the direct deaths from battle of civil war
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Battle deaths from non-state based conflicts</td>
<td>2940</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Human Security Report, 2009/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td></td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Battle deaths from one-sided conflicts</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Human Security Report, 2009/10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total battle deaths</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated indirect deaths from conflicts</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>derived from range of ratio of battle deaths to total war deaths in Lacina and Gleditsch 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths from terrorism</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>MIPT, reproduced in Human Security Brief 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths from genocide</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>NCTC, reproduced in Human Security Brief 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Fearon 2011; WDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>NCTC, reproduced in Human Security Brief 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>MIPT, reproduced in Human Security Brief 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Fearon 2011; WDI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: estimates of total ‘excess’ deaths in the Congo due to conflict

![Table Image]


Domestic violence is particularly difficult to quantify as it is often not reported. It has been omitted from Table 1 as a category, though it appears indirectly accounting for many of the female homicides. The proportion of female homicides due to domestic violence is estimated at between 40 and 70% (Krug GE, et al. 2002). In terms of number of incidents, domestic violence far exceeds any other kind. On the basis of 48 surveys from different countries the WHO found that between 10% and 69% had been physically assaulted by a partner (WHO 2005). Riots have also been omitted for lack of data, unless they cause more than 25 deaths and are classified as conflicts. Neither this aspect of violence, nor non-political homicides have formed part of MICROCON research, and they are not considered further in this chapter.

The next section of this chapter reviews some findings on the underlying causes of the other types of violence noted above. First, is a comparison between findings of causes of civil wars and of the underlying preconditions for genocides; secondly, we discuss the causes of riots in India; thirdly, some causes of routine violence in Indonesia are discussed, with a particular focus on the role of decentralisation in abating such violence; finally, we discuss global inequalities and their possible connection with global tensions and terrorism. Each of the findings has strong implications for policy. These are discussed in Section 3 of the paper.

2. Causes of different types of violence

2a. Genocides and civil wars
The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide defines genocide as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. Genocide is different from civil war: it usually involves deaths on a much larger scale and targets particular groups – mostly civilians - often with the aim of exterminating them. Typically in genocide – in contrast to civil wars - violence is one-sided; and, fortunately, it is a much rarer phenomenon than civil war. While genocide appears to most people as peculiar, psychopathic and incomprehensible, civil war is more ‘normal’ involving more mundane pursuit of political and economic objectives. Nonetheless, research has shown that there are socio-economic and political factors that contribute to genocide. Investigation of underlying social, economic and political causes has generally been carried out by different social scientists than those that study civil war (with Gurr as a notable exception). Stewart (2011) compares the findings of the two sets of investigation to see how far they have common causes.

Major differences in definitions of civil war and genocide are:

1. The scale: civil wars can involve quite low rates of death, whereas the deaths in events described as genocide are generally much higher. However, at the upper end, civil wars can involve very high death rates without genocide being a factor (like the Biafran war in Nigeria).
2. The role of the state: the state tends to be the prime agent in genocide; some definitions of civil war also require the state to be a participant, but there are civil conflicts (often described as ‘communal’) in which the state is not a clear participant (for example, the violence in the middle belt of Nigeria, or in Northern Ghana).
3. The motive: in some genocides (as in the ideological ones as defined by Fein), the prime motive appears to be the elimination of a particular group. Indeed, some (like the UN) define a genocide by the presence of such a motive. In civil wars, no particular motive need be present and a variety of motives are possible. However, closer investigation of genocides suggest a mixture of motives there too (see below).

Despite these differences, there is some blurring of the distinction between the two and many episodes are classified as both civil wars and as genocides. Reviewing a mass of
research into the major socio-economic and political factors that have been identified as making civil war or genocide more likely suggests that the causes can be categorized as follows:

1. **Demographic factors**: some demographic factors appear to make conflict and genocide more likely, but in each case demography alone plays little or no part, and it is when certain demographic configurations are accompanied by particular socio-economic conditions that demographic conditions raise the risk of violence.

Demographic factors include:

   a. The ethno/religious composition of the population. Plural societies seem more likely to give rise to inter-group violence. Measures of such plurality include the fractionalisation index which is larger the higher the number of groups in a population; and a polarisation index which is at a maximum the nearer the population is divided into two equal groups (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Both civil war and genocide research shows that fractionalisation as such does not increase the risk of such events; and conflict is most likely at intermediate levels of fractionalisation, when there exist two or three large groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Bae and Ott 2008). Polarisation (which is broadly the same as intermediate levels of fractionalisation) has more of a statistical association with civil war (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005), but more so when accompanied by socio-economic inequalities; for genocide there appears only to be a relationship if there also exists socio-economic inequalities between the groups.

   b. Youth proportion: the hypothesis here is that conflict is more likely where there is a ‘youth bulge’, i.e. a particularly high proportion of people between 15 and 30. There is econometric evidence in support of this for civil wars (Urdal 2006). It seems likely that this is the case where the youth lack employment opportunities. Evidence from interviews with ex-combatants suggests that lack of jobs, security and status are behind some mobilisation ((Keen 2005); (Weinstein 2007); (Guichaoua 2007). Historians have also pointed to high unemployment (not a youth bulge as such) as a predisposing condition for genocide – for example, for Hitler’s rise to power, but there has not been
systematic statistical investigation of this for genocide. Thus in both situations
demography may play a part but only where there particular socio-economic
conditions obtain.

2. Economic factors:
   a. Per capita incomes: A general finding from the cross-country econometric
      literature on civil war is that low per capita income is associated with a higher
      risk of civil war ((Collier and Hoeffler 2000); (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999;
      Fearon and Laitin 2003). The evidence is different and less clear in relation to
      genocides. For example, (Easterly, et al. 2006) find that the frequency of what
      they call ‘mass killings’ is similar across the first three quartiles of countries and
      drops off only in the fourth quartile.
   b. Growth rate: Slow (or negative) growth has also been suggested as likely to
      give rise to civil war, partly because it generates a gap between aspirations and
      reality (which (Gurr 1970) has defined as relative deprivation), with some
      supporting evidence from Auvinen and Nafziger. Similarly, in the genocide
      literature several authors have also pointed to economic depression as a
      predisposing factor ((Midlarsky 2005; Valentino 2000)). This factor is clearly
      related to a deficiency in youth employment opportunities referred to above.
   c. Natural resources: It has been hypothesised that civil war is more likely in the
      presence of high value natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2000),
      supporting the view that ‘greed’ motivates conflict. But this finding has not
      been reproduced (Fearon 2005). The finding that oil resources are associated
      with civil war is more robust, but here too the conclusion depends on the
      model specifications and exclusion of outliers (Fearon 2005; (Humphreys and
      Weinstein 2004). No such relationship has been found for genocides.
   d. Horizontal inequalities: socio-economic horizontal inequalities (inequalities
      between religious/ethnic/regional groups) have been found to raise the risk of
      civil war significantly ((Østby 2008; Stewart 2008);(Mancini 2008);(Cederman,
      et al. 2010); (Brown 2008); (Murshed and Gates 2005). A common explanation
      of genocide is the existence of ‘social cleavages’, or ‘unusually deep ethnic,
      cultural, religious or class divisions, high levels of overt or de facto
      discrimination, political or economic exclusion and distrust of hatred between
groups” (Valentino 2000:8). Examples of genocide almost invariably show high horizontal inequalities.

3. Political factors:
   a. ‘Opportunity structure’ and political upheaval: both civil wars and genocide frequently follow political upheaval, defined by Harff as ‘an abrupt change in the political community caused by the formation of a state or regime through violent conflict, redrawing of state boundaries or defeat in international war’ ((Harff 2003):62). A number of scholars have shown that genocide is more likely during a civil war ((Melson 1989; Melson 1992); (Midlarsky 2005); Easterly et al 2006; (Krain 1997). Harff found that ‘all but one of 37 genocides and politicides that began between 1955 and 1998 concurred during or immediately after political upheavals’ (Harff 2003: 62). The finding is less strong for civil war but the literature shows civil war is more likely during political crises and transitions (Hegre et al, 2001).
   
   b. Regime type: the civil war literature finds that civil war is most likely in ‘intermediate’ regimes (intermediate between authoritarian states and established democracies). In contrast, genocide has been found to be most likely in authoritarian regimes, with genocide more likely the greater the concentration of power. ‘The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others, murder its foreign and domestic subjects (Rummel 1995; Rummel 1994). Most statistical investigations support this finding (Fein 1993; Fein 1993, 2000; Harff 2003, 2009; Easterly et al 2006).
   
   c. Constitutional design: for civil war, it is mostly found that federalism and decentralisation reduce the risk of conflict, but much depends on the precise design of these systems ((Bakke and Wibbels 2006; Schneider and Wiesehomeir 2008). Decentralisation may reduce national level conflicts but increase local level ones ((Green 2008); (Diprose 2009 ). In the civil war research the extent of concentration/deconcentration of power has generally not been clearly separated from the extent of autocracy, but one study found no independent influence of concentration of power, once autocracy had been taken into account (Krain 1997).
d. Political horizontal inequalities and political exclusion: a strong finding for both civil war and genocide is the association with high levels of political horizontal inequalities and political exclusion. This is a finding of cross-country studies of Cederman et al 2010; (Wimmer, et al. 2009), 2010. As noted political HIs when present strengthen the effects of socio-economic His in raising the risk of conflict. For genocide, it is consistently argued that political exclusion is an important predisposing element. For example Fein 1993 shows a high probability of genocide for states with high discrimination or exclusion of an ethnoclass (see also (Kuper 1981); Harff 2003). Again what Kuper describes as a ‘superimposition of inequalities’ (where there are political and economic inequalities) make genocide more likely.

The conclusions from this review of findings in the two cases are brought together in Table 2.

**Table 2: Predisposing factors for civil war and genocide**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributory factors</th>
<th>Civil war</th>
<th>Genocide/politicide/democide/mass killings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demography</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fractionalisation</td>
<td>Little evidence as an independent factor, but most conflict at intermediate levels of fractionalisation</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High proportion of youth</td>
<td>Correlation, probably associated with lack of employment opportunities</td>
<td>Not investigated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic stagnation</td>
<td>Argued, little evidence</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low national per capita incomes</td>
<td>Strong evidence that raises risks</td>
<td>Intermediate levels of per capita income more risky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent-seeking</td>
<td>Argued, but evidence not</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
opportunities | strong
---|---
Horizontal inequalities | Strong evidence of association | Suggested and some evidence but not investigated very systematically

Political factors

| Opportunity structure and political upheaval | Strongly argued and some evidence, including irregular transitions | Systematic evidence, including ongoing civil war |
| Regime type | Most incidence in ‘intermediate’ regimes and regimes in transition | Most incidence in authoritarian regimes |
| Constitutional design: checks and balances and decentralisation | Some (mixed) evidence that more decentralisation reduces conflict propensity | No evidence |
| Marginality from the world system | No association with conflict onset, but greater global integration associated with lower probability of conflict presence. Direction of causality in question. | Some evidence shows that more marginality increases conflict and other evidence shows no relationship |
| Political horizontal inequalities/political exclusion | Strong evidence especially if associated with socio-economic inequalities | Evidence from case histories and some econometric evidence |
| History of past conflict/genocide | Strong statistical evidence (not summarised above) | Strong statistical evidence (not summarised above) |

**Similarities between the conditions which give rise to civil war and genocide include:**

1. In both cases a past history of civil war/genocide is a predisposing condition. In the case of genocide, civil war itself is almost invariably a precursor of genocide.
2. In neither case are demographic factors – in particular the ethnic composition of the population - strongly associated with incidence; but in both cases, it seems that the mid-range of ELF (or having a few large groups) is statistically most dangerous when
associated with particular socio-economic conditions, notably inequalities between major
groups (horizontal inequalities – HIs). Yet, in the case of genocide it seems that a relatively
small group may be the target, or, when in government, the initiator of the slaughter.

3. In both cases, horizontal inequalities between salient groups - in either economic or
political dimensions - raise the risk of conflict, and the risks seem to rise where the two
occur simultaneously; the evidence for economic inequalities is more limited for
genocides, and more research is needed on this.

Two major differences between civil war and genocide are apparent from this review:

1. While countries with low per capita incomes present high risks for civil war, it is
intermediate levels of income that are most strongly associated with genocide.
2. Autocratic-totalitarian regimes are most likely to initiate genocide, while intermediate
regimes are most likely to be associated with civil wars.

These are very general findings based on reviewing many investigations of major episodes of
violence - genocide and civil war. We now turn to two detailed case studies of different types
of violence: the first, on the determinants of riots in Indian states; and the second on whether
decentralization reduces routine violence, exploring the case of Indonesia.

2b. Civil unrest in India

Much of the analysis of the causes of conflict (such as that reviewed above) focuses on large
scale civil war. Much less attention has been given to local conflicts and social upheavals,
although (Barron, et al. 2009 ; Varshney 2002) are important exceptions. Yet such conflicts
can disrupt economic development and undermine human security. Sometimes they also
lead to larger conflagrations.

India has been subject to recurrent episodes of civil unrest, as shown in Figure 1. These riots
were mostly clashes ‘between different castes, and between opposite ethnic and religious
interests (largely between Hindu and Muslim communities), as a response to disparities in the
distribution of employment conditions, access to land and other assets, use of and access to
social services and access to institutional power and legal institutions’ (Justino 2007: 18). I.e.
economic, social and political HIs underlay these conflicts.
[Riots are defined ‘as collective acts of spontaneous violence that include five or more people (Gurr 1970)].

Yet riots in India did not escalate into civil war, but generally subsided in response to two kinds of government action – an increase in police action or redistributive transfers. Justino presents a model of how these two types of response might affect the level of unrest in a society consisting of two groups, one elite group with privileged access to economic and political resources, and a subordinate group that has limited access economic, social and political opportunities – i.e. groups facing sharp and consistent HIs. In this context, conflict potential is high. Conflict management consists in a combination of the use of policing and/or transfers from the rich to the poor group.

It is assumed that police action represses immediate rioting, but it contributes to further discontent in subsequent periods – the relative impact of the immediate versus the medium term effects of additional police action will determine whether a particular increase in police action contributes to a medium term escalation or reduction in conflict. The extent of horizontal inequality is assumed to affect conflict propensity. However, in her model, Justino assumes that only changes in relative income inequality between the groups affect conflict
propensity. A transfer, T, from the rich to the poor group will reduce inequality and the propensity to riot both in the short and in the medium term.

Putting these mechanisms together, her main hypothesis is:

\[ C_t = C_{t-1} - \sigma P_t + \lambda P_{t-1} + \theta I^{t-1} \] \hspace{1cm} (1)

Where \( C_t, C_{t-1} \) is conflict at time \( t \) and \( t-1 \); \( P_t, P_{t-1} \), is policing at \( t \) and \( t-1 \); \( 1/\theta \) represents society’s inequality aversion; \( I^{t-1} \) is the extent of horizontal inequality at time \( t-1 \); and \( \sigma, \lambda \) represent the elasticity of conflict with respect to a change in policing currently and in the previous period.

It is assumed that any changes in the income of the poor group is equivalent to the value of the transfers,

i.e. \( I_t = \Delta Y^{A_t} - T_t \)

Substituting this into (1),

\[ C_t = C_{t-1} - \sigma P_t + \lambda P_{t-1} + \theta [\Delta Y^{A_{t-1}} - T^{t-1}] \] \hspace{1cm} (2)

Using panel data for 14 states in India, Justino tests the validity of the model in the Indian context and the values of the coefficients, as well as exploring some underlying causes of rioting. The major results are:

1. Redistributive transfers are associated with decreases in civil unrest. The number of riots decrease by 0.3-0.4% for each extra rupee spent on social services in period \( t-1 \). The results are stronger for models taking into account endogeneity.
2. In all models, the current use of police reduces conflict, whereas generally the coefficient for lagged policing is positive. ‘The coefficients show that on average across the main 14 states, India needs to hire 20 more policemen in order to have one less riot per year...whereas every additional 25 policemen used in each period will result in one additional riot five years later.’ (Justino, 2007: 30).

Other factors systematically significantly related to civil unrest are levels of past unrest, poverty headcount, and levels of state income. Higher levels of state income are positively related to conflict unrest which contradicts cross country data which shows the lower the income per capita the higher the conflict propensity. But the cross country investigations do not include poverty as a separate variable.

Although the fundamental assumption of the model is that higher horizontal inequality leads to greater unrest, she does not test this directly, only via the peace-making effects of transfers as measured by social expenditures. The fact that poverty levels are positively associated with unrest and so is state level of per capita income suggests that we would find that vertical inequality (inequality among households) is positively related with unrest, and this may also be an indicator of horizontal inequality.

Putting together her findings on the coefficients of policing and social expenditures suggests that increasing social expenditures is a cheaper mechanism for reducing unrest than increasing policing and has the further advantage of reducing poverty which would also contribute to a reduction in unrest.

2c. Routine violence and decentralisation in Indonesia

‘Routine violence’ or ‘everyday’ violence is violence that recurs on a regular basis (Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2008)). Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2008) define it as ‘all types of collective violence outside the ethno-communal and separatist forms’ (3). This type of violence ‘does not have the explicit political aim of overthrowing the state as in the case of civil war, or the emasculation of a rival group as in the case of ethno-communal violence. It is not simply crime, although it could have criminal dimensions’ (8). The most common examples are brawls between villages neighbourhoods or group and vigilante violence, which is notably
high in Indonesia (Welsh 2003). A data base compiled by UNSFIR, on the basis of newspaper reporting, identified the following incidents of routine violence in Java:

Table 3. Routine–everyday violence by cleavages in Java, 2001-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cleavages</th>
<th>Number of incidents</th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-community</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-community</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between parts of the state apparatus</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
<td><strong>669</strong></td>
<td><strong>213</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Murshed and Tajoeddin 2008.

The reported incidence of this type of violence rose rapidly from 1994 to 2001 and then declined (Figure 2).

![Graph showing routine violence by year](image)

**Figure 2. Routine–everyday violence in Java, 1994-2003**
Source: Murshed and Tajoeddin 2008

There has been very little analysis of the underlying causes of this sort of violence, in contrast to the investigations of civil war and criminality. Murshed and Tajoeddin hypothesise that a gap between aspirations and realities (Gurr 1970) may be one cause; and suggest that violence may rise (possibly for this reason as aspirations rise more than realities) as
development occurs, but with further development, it subsequently declines (Bates 2001). ‘Routine violence in societies like contemporary Indonesia may be symptomatic of the return of privatised social violence, precipitated by economic decline and the frustration spawned by greater awareness in the midst of the lack of commensurate progress’ (Murshed and Tadjoeddin: 9). Political transition may also lead to an increase in ‘private’ violence.

Welsh has argued that everyday violence is associated with lawlessness and distrust of the state. Murshed and Tadjoeddin hypothesise that the radical decentralisation that occurred in Indonesia from 2001 may have increased trust of the state and consequently contributed to a decline in such private violence. The decentralisation process was motivated by the desire to increase the autonomy of the states fighting for separatism, but it applied throughout the country. The decentralisation was on a major scale. The proportion of total public expenditure accounted for by the provinces and districts was 20% in 1999 (pre-decentralization) and rose to 26% in the 2001 and to 37% by 2007 when Indonesia became one of the most decentralised states in the world. At an aggregate level, this process was accompanied by a decline in routine violence (Figure 2), but it remained above the 1994 level – when presumably it was kept in check by the strong state of Suharto.

To assess whether there is a relationship between decentralisation and the level of routine violence, Murshed and Tadjoeddin investigate whether districts in West Java¹ with more decentralisation, as measured first, by the increase in the magnitude of fiscal decentralisation, and secondly, by the size of post-decentralisation local government, are less prone to routine violence.

The number of routine violent incidents is the dependent variable, and they adopt two econometric approaches appropriate for testing a model where the dependent variable is discrete: a Poisson regression model and a negative binomial model.

The overall increase in fiscal expenditure for all districts in Java was 143% with a standard deviation of 54, pointing to considerable variation in the extent of actual decentralisation. In

¹ Accounting for 90% of Java’s population and 54% of Indonesia’s.
addition, they consider confounding factors, including growth in incomes of the district, per capita incomes, per capita incomes squared (to allow for an eventual reduction in violence as incomes grow beyond a point) and population size. The results of cross-section analysis (Table 4) show a highly significant negative effect of decentralisation on routine violence, according to both models; income per capita has the expected positive sign (but significant only in the Poisson model), and income squared the predicted negative sign (also significant only in the Poisson model). Population size has a significant positive effect on routine violence, more populous districts being more violent, as one might expect, especially since the incidents of routine violence are measured per district not per person in each district. The growth variable is not significant. Using panel data gets almost identical results (Table 5), although the non-binomial model now shows somewhat more significant results.

Table 4: Fiscal decentralisation and routine violence, cross-sectional analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact of fiscal decentralization</strong></td>
<td>-0.661 ***</td>
<td>-0.441 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth (average RGDP growth 2001-03, in decimal)</strong></td>
<td>2.807</td>
<td>2.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income (average per capita RGDP 2001-03, Rp)</strong></td>
<td>5.53E-07 ***</td>
<td>3.7E-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income squared</strong></td>
<td>-1.61E-13 ***</td>
<td>-6.93E-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (in 2001)</strong></td>
<td>4.1E-07 ***</td>
<td>5.4E-07 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>98</th>
<th>98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-330.025</td>
<td>-271.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood ratio</td>
<td>0.496274</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; each regression has a constant term.

Source: Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2008

Table 5: Panel model
Adopting alternative measures of decentralisation again shows a strong negative association between decentralisation, as measured by size of local government or by locally generated revenue, and routine violence. Income per capita ceases to be significant, but income per capita squared is significant (and negatively associated with violence). Population size remains significant.

Two qualifications need to be made before interpreting these findings in a causal way. First, one would expect a decline in violence as the democratic regime matured. The peak in 2000 seems to be associated with the transition to democracy. However, this would not explain the variation across districts at one point in time. Secondly, there may be some sample selection bias, since one reason why some districts achieved more decentralisation, a greater relative size of local government, and of locally generated revenue, may be that they were less violent prone.

To summarise, Murshed and Tadjoeddin find some support for the view that routine violence rises with income but at a declining rate, which may be due to the relative deprivation hypothesis, interpreted as the gap between aspirations and reality; the strong rise and then fall in total routine violence over these years suggests that political transition was one important factor; and finally, it seems that decentralisation is definitely associated with lesser violence, though the direction of causality is not proven.
2. d. A global perspective

The previous sections have discussed causes of violence within a nation, both at national and local levels. This section moves from the national to the global level. Following Stewart 2009, it argues that the underlying causes of global tensions are similar to those at the national level. In particular, it argues that global horizontal inequalities, economic, political and cultural – between Muslims and others – underlie many contemporary global tensions.

Consequent violence takes two main forms: international terrorism and domestic terrorism and civil wars with strong international interventions. The twin tower event represents the extreme (to date) of international terrorism, although there have been many other incidents; domestic terrorist events are to be seen regularly in Pakistan, for example where over 30,000 people have been killed since 2001; and the Afghanistan and Iraqi civil wars are examples of civil wars that were initiated by and involve extensive international action.

The inequalities that can be argued to underpin these events occur at two broad levels: they are to be seen within many countries, both developed and developing; and between Islamic countries and others at a global level.

National Inequalities

a. 

HIs faced by Muslims in Europe

Investigation of three countries - the Netherlands, France and the UK - illustrates the multiple inequalities Muslims face in Europe. Similar evidence is available for other European countries. With the exception of small historical enclaves such as the Bosniaks, Muslims in developed countries mainly consist of fairly recent immigrants - from North Africa, in the case of France; Turkey, in the case of Germany; Bangladesh and Pakistan in the UK; and some combination in most other European countries.

Muslims in the Netherlands, mostly of Moroccan or Turkish and, to a lesser extent, Indonesian origin, form about 6% of the total population. In France there is little hard data available because of governments decision to deny all such group categorisation in data collection. However, piecemeal evidence suggests that Muslims in France (largely from north Africa)
account for perhaps 4 million people, also around 6% of the total population. The Muslim population in the United Kingdom is smaller - largely composed of immigrants, and their descendants, from Bangladesh and Pakistan, who together accounted for only 2% of the total population in 2001.

Extensive evidence shows that socio-economic HIs disadvantage Muslims across multiple dimensions – including housing, education, employment and incomes. In each country, most Muslims live in low-income areas of major cities. In the Netherlands, more than half of Turks and more than 60% of Moroccans have an unskilled job, compared with less than 30% of native Dutch. There is evidence of discrimination in the labour market and the educational system. ([SCP] 2005). The incomes of Moroccan men are 42% below those of the native Dutch, and those of Turkish men, 34% below. Poverty rates among the elderly are substantially higher than for native Dutch (Demant et al. 2007). Education levels are significantly lower for the Muslim community – 40% of Turks and 45% of Moroccans have had no more than primary education; drop-outs rates are higher (Demant, et al. 2007).

In France, educational attainments are also worse for the Muslim population than the native population, with more repeat years, higher dropout rates, lower attainments in examinations, less attendance at high school and fewer diplomas. According to a report on Muslims in the EU, French Muslims have higher unemployment than native French and more difficulties in finding long-term fulltime employment (Viprey 2002).

In Britain, deprivations have been extensively documented by the Equality Commission Review(Commission 2007). As they state:

‘The emergence of British Muslims as a group who are widely recognised to be systematically disadvantaged predates any concern about security. Muslims account for a disproportionate number of people living in areas of multiple deprivation: more than two in three Bangladeshis and more than half of all Pakistanis live in areas in the bottom decile for deprivation.’ (Equality Commission Review, 2007: 35).

In more detail, the Equality Commission Review notes that the net earnings of Bangladeshi males were reported as just half those of white males (p 25; Interim Report) and deprivation is evident in education at every level of education. For example, Pakistani and Bangladeshi
rates of attainments in language and literacy at an early age were 57% of those of whites; their achievement of 5-GSEs was three quarters of that of whites for boys and a bit higher for girls; and they were underrepresented in higher education. However, there is evidence of some catch-up in recent years (Sefton and Stewart 2009). Disadvantages are also reported with respect to health (Equality Commission Review: 75).

There is cultural discrimination in each of the countries, with dress being a particular issue. For example, within schools in the Netherlands, there are frequent complaints about dress, especially the wearing of hijabs. In France too, the issue of the headscarf has created periodic controversy with schools expelling children for wearing them. There is less controversy on this in Britain, however. In all three counties, national holidays are Christian or secular, and there are not Muslim holidays. There has been periodic cultural controversy – notably in the Netherlands with the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, who was making a film attacking Muslim practices.

Political inequalities are also in evidence, though they seem to be less marked in the Netherlands, where Muslims are currently represented in parliament and the cabinet, broadly proportionately. Muslims, but they are underrepresented in the police, with only 6% of the police in major cities having an immigrant background, although they account for about 30% of the population (Demant et al., 2007). In France, in contrast, there is no Muslim representation in parliament, though there are a number of Muslim candidates. At the cabinet level, the first Muslim minister was appointed in 2005. In the UK, ethnic minority groups as a whole constituted less than 2.3% of members of parliament in 2005 (despite accounting for 10% of the population). They are underrepresented in the judiciary and legal system.

While I have selected just three countries in Europe, similar findings would emerge from other European countries, such as Germany, with its large and underprivileged Turkish population, and Denmark where the Muslim population has been subject to attack from the infamous cartoons, which represent a strong anti-Muslim strand in the Danish population. However, in policy terms, a noteworthy exception is the Spanish Zapatero government which
‘granted amnesty to a swathe of illegal (mainly Moroccan) immigrants in 2004 shortly after his election and the Madrid bombings’. ²

b. HIs faced by Muslim communities in Asia

Where Muslims consist of almost the entire population (Bangladesh and Pakistan), the issue of HIs with non-Muslims does not arise and these countries are not considered further here; where Muslims are in a majority, as in Indonesia and Malaysia, political dominance can be used to advance their socio-economic position. The most problematic situation is where Muslims are in a minority and suffer consistent HIs across political, socio-economic and cultural status dimensions.

Malaysia: In Malaysia, the majority are Muslim (the Malay community and other indigenous groups) and account for around two-thirds of the population, while the Chinese (24% of the population) are mainly either Christian or Buddhist, and the Indian population (6.5%) mainly Hindus, with sizeable Muslim and Christian minorities. Severe inequalities when Malaysia became independent, with the Chinese far richer than Malays, have been partially corrected by comprehensive policies since the 1970s. Yet economic inequalities favouring non-Muslims persist (Figure Three). Politically and culturally, however, Muslims dominate.

² Personal communication from Mansoob Murshed.
Figure Three: Income per capita of groups in Malaysia

Source: Malaysia: Government of Malaysia, successive Plans, Putrajaya: Economic Planning Unit

Indonesia. In Indonesia, Muslims account for over 84% of the population, with most of the remainder Christian according to the 2000 census. Muslim incomes, on average, are substantially below all other groups, apart from the small Hindu population. Given the political and demographic dominance of Muslims, these differences are normally not provocative – although there were attacks on the Christian Chinese during economic crisis (in the late 1990s). Moreover, while Muslims have been politically dominant at the national level, in some areas of the archipelago where colonial Christianization took hold more strongly, Christian groups have also played an important role historically. Amid rapid and extensive decentralization in the post-Suharto era, competition for political and economic power at the local level fed into extensive Christian/Muslim violence in Ambon, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi (which also involved ethnic differences).

Table 6: Income HIs in Indonesia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share of population, %</th>
<th>Ratio of income per capita to Muslim income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>1 [1.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.58 [1.29]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.50 [1.25]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.97 [1.17]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhists</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.61 [0.93]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from the 1995 Inter-Censal Survey (SUPAS) data
Bracketted figures = coefficient of variation

India. The Muslim population in India, which accounted for 13.4% of the Indian population in 2001, is systematically worse off than the Hindu population, on average.

Educational differences between Muslims and Hindus in India persisted throughout the twentieth century (Deolalikar 2008). Average years of completed schooling among Muslim literacy rates in 2001 were 59% compared with an all India rate of 65%. Overall Muslims are more likely to be engaged in self-employment and much less likely to have regular salaried jobs (especially in the government or large public and private sector enterprises) (India 2006). Muslim regular employees receive lower daily salary earnings in both public sector and private sector jobs. (Government of India 2006). Muslim and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs/STs) have been persistently the most disadvantaged groups in terms of headcount poverty. In 2004-5 for example, the Muslim poverty rate was 43% compared with a rate of 27% for all Hindus. However, Muslim infant and child mortality rates are better than Hindus – an unexpected finding given the worse educational and economic situation. This has been attributed to different behavioural patterns, although as Deolalikar comments, the reason why there is this advantage ‘is a question that needs further exploration’ (Deolalikar 2008: 6).

There is abundant evidence of political inequalities between Muslims and Hindus. In the Indian parliament, the Lok Sabha, Muslim representation was 6.6% in 2004 (Ansari 2006), in comparison with a population share of over 13%. There was also underrepresentation in State

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3 Scheduled castes and tribes – among the Hindus – also face multiple deprivations and are generally worse off than Muslims as a group (Government of India 2006).
Assemblies (Ansari 2006). Muslims also face cultural inequalities, sometimes coming to a head with physical attacks on mosques.

**China.** There is very little data on the socio-economic position of Muslims in China who account for an estimated 1-2% of the total population or around 20 million people, in several ethnic groups, including Hui (largely Mandarin speaking), and Dongxiang and Uigur (Turkic speaking), although it seems that Muslims are generally disadvantaged. Data on educational performance show relative disadvantage, with the extent varying among ethnic groups, partly because of the increasing use of Mandarin in schools (Table 7).
Table 7: Enrolment rates by population group in China, from 200 census, % of age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslims in China, ethnic group</th>
<th>No-school</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongxiang</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uigur</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Philippines and Thailand.** There is a strong similarity in the position of Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand relative to the rest of the population. Both form small minorities living in poor regions and facing HIs relative to the rest of the population within their region as well. Muslims in the Philippines account for about 5% of the total population, but a much larger proportion in Mindanao region – around 20% today (a sharp drop over the last 100 years largely due to immigration from the rest of the Philippines, encouraged by the state). Likewise, in Thailand, the Muslim population forms a small proportion of the total Thai population (4.6%), but a much larger proportion in the Southern region (28% in 2000). (Data from CIA and Brown, 2008). In both cases, there has been violent opposition—stronger in the Philippines, more sporadic in Thailand, in which the rebels seek greater political autonomy.

In both countries, the Muslim populations are doubly disadvantaged Brown (2008): first, the regions in which they are located have lower per capita incomes (and growth rates) than the rest of the country; and secondly within the region of concentration, the Muslim population does less well than the rest of the population.

In the Philippines, Mindanao as a whole has been consistently below the national average in terms of GDP per capita, and particularly below Luzon. Within Mindanao, the socio-economic performance of the five provinces in the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao (ARRM) is worst of all the Philippines. (Brown, 2008).
Within Southern Thailand, Muslims are disadvantaged relative to the majority Buddhists. For example, in 1987 (the only year for which there are data of this kind), Buddhist males had 1.68 times the years education of Muslim males; and the discrepancy in household assets was 1.17 (Brown, 2008: 273). In Thailand, the Southern region where the Muslim population is concentrated also shows worse economic performance than the rest of the country.

**Muslim/non-Muslim HIs in West Africa.**

In West Africa too, the demographic position of Muslims varies. In some countries Muslims form a significant minority (Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana), in Nigeria they account for about half the population and in Niger and Mali they dominate the population. In general Muslims are concentrated in the North of each country, so that data on regional inequalities gives some guide to Muslim/other HIs.

In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, all socio-economic indicators are worse in the north of the country where Muslim are concentrated. For Benin, while education indicators (literacy and school attendance) are worse in all four Northern regions than the national average, and income per head is worse in three, life expectancy is as good or better, possibly reflecting lower rates of HIV/AIDs among Muslim populations. Data on height differences show Northern disadvantage in Cameroon, Chad and Côte d’Ivoire (Moradi and Baten 2005).

While there is generally economic and social disadvantage among Muslims, the situation with respect to political and cultural status varies markedly with demography as well as national attitudes and practices. In the majority states, Muslim cultural and political status is generally good. But there is considerable variation elsewhere. For example, in Ghana there is a culture of inclusion both politically and in relation to general status; but in Côte d’Ivoire, Northerners were excluded politically and culturally – indeed this is thought to be a major reason for the outbreak of civil war in 2002 (Langer 2005).

**Inequalities between countries.**

The evidence thus shows systematic HIs in which Muslims are relatively deprived within countries in much of the world. There is also evidence that Muslim countries (those where
Muslims form the majority) are less well off at a global level than non-Muslim ones, in socio-economic, cultural and political terms. If we take all countries in which Muslims dominate and contrast them with all countries where other religions (or non-religions) dominate, including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and secularists, there is a clear and large gap favouring non-Muslims, although there are, of course, very big differences within each of these categories: for example, many poor countries are in the non-Muslim group (e.g. Malawi, Nepal, Bolivia); and there are some economically successful countries in the Muslim group, such as Malaysia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey. Average per capita incomes of the states where a majority of the population is Muslim are just 44% of those of the non-Muslim countries, and under five mortality rates are almost twice as high (Table 8), with considerable heterogeneity in each group. The proportion of countries in the high-HD category is much lower for Muslim countries and the proportion in the low-HD category much higher than for non-Muslim (see Figure Six). There is also a clear imbalance in political power. As indicators of this, Table 6 shows how much greater non-Muslim countries’ power is by comparing membership of the Security Council, voting rights at the IMF, and military expenditure. By each measure, the Muslim countries fall well below the non-Muslim, including when calculating these in relation to population shares, or numbers of countries.
Table 8: Comparative performance of Muslim and non-Muslim countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Muslim countries(^a), average(^b) performance</th>
<th>Non-Muslim countries average performance</th>
<th>Ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200 [89.5]</td>
<td>105 [81.5]</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 [80.3]</td>
<td>46 [55.5]</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1 [2.4]</td>
<td>1.5 [2.3]</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,470 [6,493]</td>
<td>12,497 [12,019]</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/17 (no permanent)</td>
<td>12/17 (including all permanent)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. Defined as any country with 50% or more of population classified as Muslim according to CIA FactBook. Standard
b. Country averages, not weighted by population.
c. Deviations are in square brackets.
Figure 4: Numbers of countries in high, medium and low Human Development categories.

Source: UNDP, HDRO data base.

Implications of consistent and persistent global inequalities

As indicated above, there is evidence of consistent deprivation of Muslims relative to others globally, within and between countries. Within particular countries, such inequalities can (and often) do underly group mobilisation, sometimes leading to violence, which can take the form of local disputes and violence (as in Indonesia and Nigeria), riots (as in India), or national conflict (as in Cote d'Ivoire). It seems plausible that the global inequalities underlay some of the current global tensions leading to global terrorism.

This view is supported by extensive evidence of global connections between Muslims across the world (Stewart 2009). Some of the major connections are illustrated in Figure Five. They include family connections, involving a range of communications, marriages, and remittances; education and training, in which people travel globally to Asia, the Middle East and to Europe to attend a variety of educational institutions; financial connections (outside the family ones), with finance (and aid) crossing borders, much going from the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to developing countries; the Hajj pilgrimage which takes millions to Mecca; global civil (including religious) and political institutions; and most recently media, and internet connections. While all these connections enhance a shared Muslim identity, the connections are multilayered, and the links occur among different groups of people, according to context – including importantly, differences among religious subsets of Islam – Sunnis, Shia, different madhabs within them, Sufism and different Sufi orders, liberals and
radicals, and so on⁴; as well as differences in economic activities and, interests, needs and education. The connections are neither unidirectional nor monolithic. Nonetheless, together the links are very large in number – some of which touch most Muslims in one way or another.

An example of some of the multiple connections is provided by a recent article by Tahir Abbas, himself a British Muslim, who interviews Moazzam Begg, a second generation British Muslim with a middle class background, who had been detained in Guantanamo Bay (Abbas 2007). Abbas attributes Begg’s radicalism to ‘exclusion, marginalisation, disempowerment, media bias, political rhetoric, far right hostility, perceptions in relation to British and US foreign policy, a lack of appropriate Muslim leadership in Britain and a regressive interpretation of Islam as a reactive rather than a pro-active experience’ (Abbas, 2007: 430). Inspired by a film, The Message, and facing racism in Birmingham, Moazzam began to look to Islam ‘to get rid of the cultural baggage’ (Abbas:432). He met Bosnian Muslims, blond and blue-eyed and ‘felt a great affinity towards them’ (433). In the 1990s he made eight or nine trips to Bosnia, and made financial donations to the Bosnian army. After his bookshop was raided by MI5, and he married a Pakistani woman (through an arranged marriage) he moved to Afghanistan and financed and built a school, shortly before 9/11. When asked about the London bombings, he felt ‘The targeting of individual is wrong and it shouldn’t happen...The overriding factor of the occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan was enough to spur them on to do what they did...it was this idea that it is all one and the same: the struggle in Afghanistan and Iraq and even Britain, that it’s all connected.’ (Abbas, 2007: 436).

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⁴ See e.g. Sivan, E. 2003 'The clash within Islam', Survival 45(1): 24-44. who discusses the divisions between radical Islam and liberals.
Figure Seven
These manifold global connections linking Muslims across countries make it likely that grievances in one place will be felt elsewhere – ‘it’s all connected’ as Moazzam stated. Pew surveys document the homogeneity of views across countries among Muslims and the marked differences form non-Muslims. This is illustrated in Figure 8. A high proportion of Muslims blamed Western people for poor relations between muslims and the West, and the reverse was true of non-Muslims with a considerable proportion blaming Westerners. The difference was most marked among Nigerians: 69% of Christian Nigerians blamed the Muslims and 10% Western people, while in contrast only 1% of Nigerian Muslims blamed Muslims and 83% blamed Western people. Similar differences are shown on questions of responsibility for economic failures and cultural issues.
Figure Eight: Differences in perceptions, Muslims versus others

Source: Drawn from The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006a.
3. **Policy implications**

A common finding of these studies of different types of violence is that the presence of socio-economic inequalities between groups raises the risk of violence, at global, national, and local levels. In addition, low levels of development are a predisposing factor, according to the civil war literature, while (Justino 2007) found that high levels of poverty are also, at a state level in India. Other socio-economic factors claimed to predispose to conflict and genocide are economic stagnation and high levels of unemployment; and the presence of high value natural resources which give rise to rent-seeking. However, there is less systematic evidence in support of these propositions.

Political conditions are also relevant. The civil war evidence shows that political transition tends to be associated with a rise in violence, and this is supported by the evidence on Indonesia in Murshed and Taajoeddin. In contrast, for genocide a strongly centralised and autocratic state is most likely to generate genocidal events. (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2008) suggest that decentralising the functions of the state is likely to reduce violence. In general, civil war and genocide literature show that political exclusion (or political HIs) make violence more likely, especially where this takes place in parallel with economic exclusion.

Clear policy prescriptions follow from these findings. Focussing first on socio-economic conditions, the findings suggest that policies to support development generally, to reduce poverty and to reduce horizontal inequalities, will reduce the risk of violence. Justino contrasts the effects of policies to reduce poverty and inequality with increased policing in Indian states and shows that the development oriented policies have more sustained impact in reducing violence than increasing policing. Her systematic investigations have not been carried out for military interventions in civil war – or globally – but the same model would apply, and it seems likely that similar results would be found. Yet the military option is often chosen – for example, in US aid to Pakistan, of the $20.5 b., 70% goes to security related expenditures and just 30% to support development\(^5\). Moreover, even when economic development is supported the impact

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\(^5\) Financial Times 11/05/2011
on inequality is rarely taken into account, and both national and international expenditures often worsen HIs ((Brown and Stewart 2006; Langer, et al. 2011).

Evidence from Malaysia, Northern Ireland and Nepal shows that where a developmental approach that consciously includes the aim of reducing HIs is adopted peace is sustained (or actually created in the case of Northern Ireland). (Faaland, et al. 2003; McCrudden, et al. 2004) (Stewart, 2008: 71-76) (Fukuda-Parr forthcoming 2011)

Policies that are likely to promote inclusive development include support for economic and social infrastructure, and anti-poverty programmes, such as cash transfers. Policies to correct inequalities include progressive taxation and expenditure policies, regional development programmes, effective anti-discrimination laws, human rights legislation, and affirmative action. These need to be combined with continuous monitoring of the distributional impact of the economy and policies. The need for policies directed towards improving the distribution of resources across groups is likely to be a continuous one, since the global economy tends to worsen HIs (Langer et al., 2011).

The civil war and genocide findings suggest also a need for a special effort to expand employment (also in an inclusive way). To date with rare exceptions (again including Nepal), many programmes acknowledge the need to expand employment, but in reality do very little towards this objective (Stewart 2011).

Turning to policies towards the political system, the finding that civil war is more likely during a transition to democracy – which is supported by the many incidents when elections provide the occasion for violence – might be interpreted to suggest that countries should not be encouraged to move towards a democratic system when still at an early stage of development. Yet the finding that genocide is most likely in autocratic regimes would suggest caution before coming to this conclusion. It would seem that what is needed is to accompany democratic structures with provisions ensuring that power is shared among major groups. A variety of mechanisms can be used to achieve this, some formal, some informal. Murshed and Tadjoeddin suggest decentralisation as one such mechanism. Others are forms of power-sharing at the central level (such as brought about via consociationalist structures), and/or supported by particular voting systems such as proportional representation. What is important is not the
The simple majoritarian democratic system adopted by many countries does not achieve this. The analysis of global tensions suggests that these policies are needed at the global level as well as within nations. This implies the need for a major effort to improve the relative economic position of Muslim countries generally (and Palestine in particular), and that (following Justino’s findings) this is likely to be more effective in the medium term than military interventions. It also implies an effort to reduce the evident political inequalities between Muslim countries and others, incorporating them more systematically into the governance of global institutions.

Conclusions

This chapter has found that socio-economic conditions underly many different forms and scales of violence; in each case, poverty and lack of development and group inequality appear to be at the heart of the problem. A police/military only strategy is not only associated with greater human suffering, but is also likely to be less effective than a strategy directed at the socio-economic deprivations that underly violence. There are clear implications for policy at many levels, ranging from international redistributive policy, to national and local development policies, as well as for shared political power at each of these levels. At the global level, the implication is that there should be a shift from military intervention to economic support; at the national level, similarly, with a particular focus on inclusive development; and at the local level, less emphasis on policing and more on social expenditure.

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