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Economic and Political Causes of Genocidal Violence: A comparison with findings on the causes of civil war

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**Economic and Political Causes of Genocidal Violence:
A comparison with findings on the causes of civil war¹**

Frances Stewart²

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Abstract: Genocide is different from civil war: it usually involves deaths on a much larger scale and targets particular groups – mostly civilians - often with the aim of exterminating them. The violence is one-sided, and, fortunately, genocides are much rarer than civil wars. Although with genocide, as with civil wars, it is possible to identify underlying political and economic patterns that make genocide more likely, there have been two distinct strands of investigation by social scientists: studies of the economic and political causes of ‘normal’ civil war; and those studying genocide. This paper contrasts the findings of the two strands of investigation, focussing on quantitative investigations, exploring the main differences in findings, and pointing to policy conclusions that emerge. It finds that civil wars tend to be higher in low income countries and in intermediate regimes, whereas genocides tend to be higher in low and middle income countries and in authoritarian regimes. Both, however, are more common during political upheaval and transition. In the case of genocides, civil wars themselves are one important predisposing condition. Hence policies to prevent civil wars may also contribute to preventing genocide. Once a situation has evolved in which there are high risks or actual episodes, any policy advice about preventative action is likely to fall on deaf ears. What is important is that appropriate policies should be in place in every multiethnic society to avoid a high risk situation emerging.

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1. Introduction.

The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide defines genocide as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. Genocide is different from civil war: it usually involves deaths on a much larger scale and targets particular groups – mostly civilians - often with the aim of exterminating them. Typically in genocide – in contrast to civil wars - violence is one-sided; and, fortunately, it is a much rarer phenomenon than civil war. While genocide appears to most people as peculiar, psychopathic and incomprehensible, civil war is more ‘normal’ involving more mundane pursuit of political and economic objectives. However, as we review below, like civil war, one can detect underlying political and economic patterns that make genocide more likely. Civil war typically lasts much longer than genocidal episodes, but generally involves fewer deaths – although here too the civilian population is often targeted. There is, however, some overlap between these two types of violence. As we shall see, genocide often occurs in a context of civil war, and sometimes it may be difficult to decide whether particularly virulent civil wars involve genocide or not. The violence in Darfur is an example. In both cases, historians often claim that each event is unique and can only be understood *sui generis*. Yet for both categories, social scientists have sought to find patterns in the conditions which give rise to these deadly episodes. For the most part, however, there have been two distinct strands of investigation by social scientists: studies of the economic and political causes of ‘normal’ civil war; and those studying genocide – genocidal studies.

In this paper, I contrast the findings of the two strands of investigation, focussing on quantitative investigations. Here I explore the main differences in findings, and point to policy conclusions that emerge.

Definitions

First it is necessary to differentiate ‘normal’ civil war from genocide. Numerous definitions have, of course, been put forward for both. Here I propose to use the terms as follows:

1. Civil war consists in violence (involving deaths) between groups within a country. Data sets and corresponding investigations, however, vary in interpretation in terms of

the numbers of deaths required for a civil war to count; and the parties involved; and also whether genocide is included.

- a. In some investigations, the required death rate for a conflict to count is 1,000 p.a. and in others a much lower bar is set, at 25 p.a. Here I draw on studies including either of these magnitudes.
 - b. In many data sets, civil wars are defined to occur only where the state is one party (Uppsala Conflict data). However, this excludes many communal conflicts.
 - c. Some data sets (e.g. Correlates of War project –(Small, et al. 1982)) deliberately exclude genocide. This is also true of the Uppsala data on civil war which requires that the violence is inflicted and suffered by both sides (with the requirement that at least 5% of the fatalities occur in both sides of the conflict).
2. As already noted, genocide has been defined by the United Nations Genocide Convention as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. This definition excludes the mass killing of people on the basis of their class or politics, whereas most people would accept that there was a class-based genocide in Cambodia (1975-9) and one based on politics in Indonesia in 1965-6. I therefore follow (Harff 2003) in including ‘politicides’. Other problems of the UN definition is that it includes intentions (which may not be easy to substantiate) and that it makes the state a necessary perpetrator,³ yet systematic killings of others based on their ethnic or class characteristics is carried out by non-state actors (as in many of the ethnic cleansing episodes in the former Yugoslavia). My own preferred definition is one which involves the systematic killings of a group based on their ethnicity, race, religion, class or political beliefs, perpetrated by the state or other group. However, in practice I draw on a variety of studies that have adopted different definitions, albeit all within this broad perspective.

There have been numerous attempts to develop typologies of genocides (Savon 1972; Darian 1975; Fein 1983-4; Kuper 1987; Smoth 1987; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990). These typologies are mostly based on the major motive underlying the genocide. For example, Fein suggests a fourfold classification: developmental genocide, where the

³ Harff 2003:58: ‘the genocide Convention does not take into account the possibility that nonstate actors can and do attempt to destroy rival ethnic and political groups’.

perpetrator destroys those who stand in the way of economic exploitation of resources; despotic genocide, where the aim is to eliminate real or potential opposition; retributive genocide where the aim is to destroy a long-term enemy; and ideological genocide where the group to be destroyed is presented as evil. A typology is helpful because some determinants may apply to some types but not others. But in practice, there is often a mixture of objectives and it is not easy to classify the genocide uniquely into a particular type.

Major differences in definitions of civil war and genocide are:

1. The scale: civil wars can involve quite low rates of death, whereas the deaths in an event described as genocide are generally much higher. However, at the upper end, civil wars can involve very high death rates without genocide being a factor (like the Biafran war in Nigeria).
2. The role of the state: the state tends to be (although, as noted this is not invariable) the prime agent in genocide; some definitions of civil war also require the state to be a participant, but there are civil conflicts (often described as ‘communal’) in which the state is not a clear participant (for example, the violence in the middle belt of Nigeria, or in Northern Ghana).
3. The motive: in some genocides (as in the ideological ones as defined by Fein), the prime motive appears to be the elimination of a particular group. Indeed, some (like the UN) define a genocide by the presence of such a motive. In civil wars, no particular motive need be present and a variety of motives are possible. However, closer investigation of genocides suggest a mixture of motives there too (see below).
4. The geographic arena: civil wars are defined as being *within* a nation, although actors outside the nation often play an important part. Many genocides are also internal but genocides can (try to) reach outside the nation to eliminate the targeted group in other countries.

Despite these differences, there is some blurring of the distinction between the two and many episodes are classified as both civil wars and as genocides. Yet investigation into causes has generally been by different scholars. There are some common variables such scholars have explored as root causes or conditions liable to cause civil war/genocide, and some different ones.

The next section will review the major hypotheses put forward to explain civil war and some major findings; and section 3 will do the same in relation to genocide. Section 4 compares the findings. Section 5 concludes with implications for policies towards the prevention of these violent events.

II. Causes of civil wars

While there is a temptation to seek the ‘single’ cause, in practice, as indepth investigation of any one case reveals, it is a combination of conditions which precipitates civil war or genocide. Scholars have suggested three categories of causes – demographic, socio-economic and political -and I shall discuss these separately. But it is in combination – as multivariate analysis proves – for the most part that any particular category is lethal.

IIa. Demographic composition

Much contemporary conflict is between ethnic or religious groups. Indeed, the evidence suggests the proportion of conflicts that can be described as ethno-religious has been rising (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Trends in ethnic conflict, 1945-2004, Source: Marshall (2005)

It is easy to move from this to the conclusion that wars are caused by ethnic/religious differences. It might seem therefore that the more the differences (the greater the number of

groups and/or the greater the cultural difference between them), the higher the risk of conflict. In fact evidence does not support this conclusion as, beyond a point, conflict risk seems to decline as the number of groups increase (as measured by the ethno-fractionalisation index - ELF)(Collier and Hoeffler 2000; (Fearon and Laitin 2003b)). It seems that conflict risk is highest where there are a few large groups (i.e. an intermediate level of ELF). This makes intuitive sense since if there are many small groups, no one group can dominate and collaboration becomes essential. This intuition has been formalised in the demographic polarisation index which is higher the more nearly the population is divided into two equal sized groups (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). While there is evidence that conflict risk is higher the higher the demographic polarisation index, it seems that the conflict-causing aspects of demography depend on other (political and economic) factors being present. Most research suggests that it is not the demographic composition as such but the composition combined with other factors (such as horizontal inequalities) which raises the risk of conflict (Estaban and Ray 1999).

One fundamental criticism of a simple demographic explanation is by scholars who argue that ethnicity is not an independent variable: in short “Ethnicity does not explain anything, it needs to be explained” ((Doornbos 1991), p. 19). Ethnic categorizations are fluid and constructed , and indeed those who mobilise people according to their ethnicity generally start by enhancing ethnic consciousness. However, while ethnic (and indeed some religious) distinctions are created, at any one time people inherit perceptions of ethnic difference which make ethnicity an independent as well as a dependent variable. As (Brown and Langer 2010): 415) state: ‘Although quantitative studies of ethnic diversity are inherently problematic because they require the reduction of ethnicity into exhaustive and mutually exclusive ethnic groups (something sophisticated theories of ethnicity militate against), as long as the interpretation of results is cognizant of the limitations of this kind of categorization, quantitative analysis can provide a useful systematic form of comparison.’

While some attribute contemporary conflicts to fundamental differences, arising from ethnicity or religion (e.g. Huntington 1993), such differences are evidently an insufficient explanation as many multi-ethnic or multi-religious societies live peacefully --for example, Ghana or Tanzania - while others are at peace for decades before experiencing conflict. In fact, the vast majority of multiethnic societies are at peace (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Conflict

occurs when there are particular demographic , political or socio-economic conditions, or some combination of the three. As Cohen argued: ‘Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange and bizarre customs of men from other ethnic groups, because these customs are different from their own. But they do not fight over such differences alone. When men *do*, on the other hand, fight across ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political, or both’ ((Cohen 1974): 94).

Another demographic factor is the so-called ‘youth-bulges’ cause of conflicts. This asserts that where there is a particularly large proportion of young (men), conflict is more likely because , mobilisation for conflict is an attractive option for this age group, especially if they have few other opportunities. Econometric evidence across countries for 1950-2000 support this view.

‘The results are consistent both with an expectation that youth bulges provide greater opportunities for violence through the abundant supply of youths with low opportunity costs’ (Urdal 2006: 607).

II.b Socio-economic and political causes of civil war: a review⁴

On the socio-economic side, the causes can be differentiated into those primarily concerned with individual motivation, and those concerned with group motivation. In practice, civil wars are organised by group – typically identity groups such as ethnic, religious or racial groups (or coalitions of such groups). Hence both individual and group motivation is relevant since people have multiple motives and act both out of loyalty to a group or an ideology and from the perspectives of their individual advantage. For both groups and individuals, there is a distinction between grievances as a motive; and what economists call ‘rational’ motivation, or the objective of maximising incomes or rents. The latter motivation is often described as being a matter of ‘greed’; however, while this can be an accurate representation of the elite seeking control over government , contracts and resources, it is hardly a fair or accurate descriptions of poor individuals who may fight because this is their only means of survival.

In general, it is helpful to differentiate the motives of the leaders of any conflict group and the followers, or those who actually carry out the fighting, as well as those who provide more or

⁴ This section of the paper draws of work the author with Graham Brown (Brown and Stewart 2007).

less active support – e.g. shelter and food. Motives can differ between each of these categories. In most instances of prolonged conflict all three support the conflict, since effective fighting requires their cooperation. However, (Weinstein 2007) has pointed to differences between situations where there are resources readily available to fund a conflict and those where there are not. In the former, soldiers can be enlisted and fed through mercenary means and there need not be mass support for the conflict; in the latter, however, enlistment and subsistence depends on local support and then ideology and group loyalties play a much larger role.

Individual Motivation

People who fight are, of course, individuals with their own private motivation as well as being members of a group. War give some people benefits as well as imposing heavy costs. Political sociologists, such as (Keen 1998) and (Duffield 1994) and economists, such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004), have emphasized private or individual motivation as the fundamental cause of conflict. This has its basis in rational choice economics, arguing that the net economic advantages of war to some individuals motivate them to fight (Hirshleifer 1994). In this approach, group identities are not regarded as an independent factor but are instruments, created to help fulfill the private motives of those who fight (especially leaders).

Keen lists many ways in which war confers individual benefit on particular categories of people: it permits people, especially uneducated young men, to gain employment as soldiers; it offers opportunities to loot, to profiteer from shortages and from aid; to trade arms; and to carry out illicit production and trade in drugs, diamonds, timber etc. Where alternative opportunities are few, because of low incomes and poor employment, and the possibilities of enrichment by war are considerable, wars are likely to be more numerous and longer. Conflicts may persist because some powerful actors benefit through the manipulation of scarcity, smuggling, and so forth and have no interest in resolving the conflict.

While generally not a sufficient explanation of conflict, it is clear that the expected rewards sometimes play a role in the decision to rebel. As Collier notes, citing the cases of Aceh (Indonesia), Biafra (Nigeria) and Katanga (Zaire), separatist rebellion often emerges in resource rich areas of a country, leading him to conclude that rebellion is ‘the rage of the rich’ (Collier 2000: 10). However, there are also examples of separatist movements in regions with poor resource endowment - for example, the Muslim rebellion in Thailand, the Tamils in Sir Lanka, or the cases of Eritrea, and Bangladesh. Moreover, even in resource rich

areas, leaders may not gain: Hassan di Tiro, for example, left a secure position at the United Nations in New York to instigate the Acehnese uprising. In the case of Colombia, often depicted as a 'greed' motivated conflict, interviews with both leaders and those who were mobilized to fight, show that generally their economic position worsened as a result of participating in the conflict – most put forward ideological reasons, including the issue of land reform (Sanín 2004). Moreover, even the conflicts in the natural resource rich promoting the objective of political and cultural autonomy for the ethnic group is also typically an important source of mobilization.

At a local level, small conflicts often erupt over resources – access to land or water for example. Increasing environmental and population pressures tend to increase the likelihood of such conflicts – indeed Thomas Homer-Dixon and the 'Toronto Group' (Homer-Dixon 1991; Homer-Dixon 1994; Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998) have argued that 'green wars' are becoming increasingly prevalent. The essence of this perspective is that contest for control over declining natural resources, often intensified by population pressures, is a major cause of violent conflict around the world. Poorer societies are more at risk because they will be 'less able to buffer themselves' from environmental pressures (Homer-Dixon 1994: 6). The Toronto group concluded, in the early 1990s, that there would probably be 'an upsurge of violence in the coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity' (Homer-Dixon 1994: 6). In the first decade, following this prognostication, there was in fact some decline in the number of conflicts, but their prediction could come to pass in later decades.

The environment scarcity view has been criticized by Fairhead (2000) who argues that it is environmental riches not scarcity that is associated with conflict, interpreting environmental riches as the presence of valuable natural resources such as those found in the Congo. The environmental riches hypothesis thus fits into the private motivation/greed hypothesis. It is possible, indeed, that both environmental poverty and environmental riches may cause conflict, for different reasons and in different circumstances. While it is clear that pressures arising from environmental scarcity may play an important role in many conflicts, the environmental scarcity hypothesis is – and doesn't claim to be more – a partial theory that contributes towards our understanding of causes of a set of conflicts, but not the general conditions under which conflict is likely to arise.

Another explanation of civil war is a demographic hypothesis, relating to the ‘youth bulge’: this rests on the empirical finding that conflict incidence appears to be higher where there is a particularly large number of youths relative to the rest of the population (Urdal 2006). The existence of large numbers of young (particularly males) – *especially if they lack satisfactory employment* – provides a pool of people who can readily be mobilised and may gain individually from joining militia – in terms of material advancement, their own security, and their psychological well being ((Guichaoua 2006; Guichaoua 2007; Keen 2001)

There have been numerous econometric cross-country investigations of these ‘individualistic’ theories. The following factors have been shown to be associated with a higher probability of civil war:

- Low national per capita incomes (associated with poor opportunities for survival, and also possibly with weak governments and poor capacity to suppress rebellion).
- Recent economic decline (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999)
- A youth bulge (associated with poor opportunities for the young, especially where employment opportunities are scarce, but there’s no direct evidence on unemployment or underemployment, because of weak data).
- Some (disputed) association with oil resources. However, this finding depends on the model specification and exclusions of outliers (Fearon and Laitin 2003a; Humphreys and Varshney 2004).
- More ambiguously, an association with natural resources more generally – but this finding of (Collier and Hoeffler 2000) has not been reproduced (Fearon 2005; Horowitz).
- Highly ambiguous evidence on a relationship between inequality (vertical among individuals) and conflict risk.

Group Motivation

Organised political conflicts, in contrast to most forms of criminality, consist in fighting between groups - groups who wish to gain independence or take over the state and others who resist this, aiming to preserve the integrity of the nation or their power (Gurr 1993). The groups who fight are united under a common banner, with broadly common purposes or

‘group motives’. While individual motivation is also important, it appears that group mobilization and group motivation underlies civil wars.

Groups engaged in internal conflict are often united by a common ethnic or religious identity. Since 1945, the proportion of conflicts attributable to ethnic violence has been steadily increasing (Figure 1). These conflicts may be presented as religious (e.g. the Philippines or Thailand, where, in both cases, the rebels are Muslims and the national government non-Muslim) or ethnic (as in Rwanda or Burundi); such identities provide a powerful source of mobilization and unity. Yet, as noted above, many multiethnic and multi religious societies live relatively peacefully, and in many situations, ethnic or religious identities are not perceived as of overriding importance by the majority of people. Hence we need to look beyond religion or ethnicity, as such, to find the causes of ‘ethnic’ conflict. One plausible hypothesis is that it is where there are significant underlying differences in access to economic or political resources, providing both leaders and followers with a strong motive to fight, that ethnic or religious differences can lead to violent mobilization. Gurr (1995.; 1970) terms such group differences ‘relative deprivation’ and Stewart defines differences in groups’ access to economic, social and political resources as ‘horizontal inequalities’, in contrast to the traditional ‘vertical’ inequality that ranks individuals in measures such as the Gini coefficient. The horizontal inequalities explanation of conflict is based on the view that when cultural differences coincide with economic and political differences between groups, this can cause deep resentments that may lead to violent struggles. These inequalities may involve regional differentiation, in which case they often lead to separatist movements (as in Aceh, Indonesia; and the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka); or the different identities may occur within the same geographic space (such as in Rwanda, or Northern Ireland or Uganda), when political participation and economic and political rights are at stake.

Horizontal inequalities (HIs) are multidimensional, involving access to a large variety of resources along economic, social and political vectors or dimensions. In the economic vector it is not just income that is important, but also access to employment and to a variety of assets (land, finance, education). Along the social vector, access to services (e.g. health, water) and to assets (housing) can form relevant HIs. The political vector includes power at the top (the presidency, cabinet), at lower levels (parliamentary assemblies, local government), in the bureaucracy at all levels, in the army and the police. The relevant HIs are those that matter to people, and this varies across societies. For example, in Zimbabwe unequal access to land is

important, while in Northern Ireland important differences concern HIs in housing, education and jobs.

HIs seem to be more provocative where inequalities are felt consistently across the different dimensions – in particular, the political and economic. Economic and social HIs generate conditions which lead to general dissatisfaction among the group members, and consequently give rise to the possibilities of political mobilization; but it is political exclusion that is likely to trigger a conflict, by giving group leaders a powerful motive to organize in order to gain support.

While horizontal inequalities give rise to political movements, these are not necessarily violent. Whether they become violent or not depends on whether the demands can be accommodated by the political system, or whether they meet resistance. Relatively rich groups may instigate conflict, as well as relatively poor. The relatively rich do so to preserve their riches (and/or power) for themselves, while the relatively poor out of a sense of injustice with the intention of achieving some redistribution.

There is econometric support from cross-country and within country data to show that higher socio-economic horizontal inequalities are associated with a greater probability of civil war. For example:

- Østby's (2008) analysis across 55 countries for 1986–2003, reveals a significant rise in the probability of conflict in countries with severe economic and social HIs. The effect of HIs is quite high: the probability of conflict increases threefold when comparing the expected conflict onset when all variables have average values, compared to a situation where the extent of horizontal inequality of assets among ethnic groups is at the 95th percentile.⁵
- Cederman et al., 2010, again using cross-country evidence and the G-Econ data set for 1991 to 2005, show that 'groups with wealth levels far from the country average are indeed more likely to experience civil war' (24). This is found whether the group is wealthier *or* poorer than the average.
- Brown 2008 has come to a similar finding exploring the determinants of separatist conflicts. He covers 31 countries, from East and Western Europe, North and South America and South and East Asia. Again, the likelihood of a separatist conflicts

⁵ In the case of inter-regional HIs, the probability of conflict increases 2.5 times as HIs rise from the mean value to the 95th percentile value. See also Østby (2003).

increases the richer or poorer a region is in terms of GDP per capita, compared with the national average.

- In addition, intra-country studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the level of HIs and the incidence (or intensity) of conflict. Mancini 2008 uses district-level data to examine the connection between HIs and the incidence of conflict in districts of Indonesia, finds that horizontal inequality in child mortality rates and its change over time are positively (and significantly) associated with the occurrence of deadly ethno-communal violence. He also shows that violent conflict is more likely to occur in areas with relatively low levels of economic development and greater religious polarisation. In contrast, standard measures of (vertical) income inequality were found to have no significant impact on the likelihood of communal violence.
- Studies in other conflict-affected countries have shown a relation between HIs and intensity of conflict. For example in the Philippines (Magdalena (1977) examining the Moro rebellion in the southern Philippines, and records a strong link between the relative deprivation of Muslims, measured in terms of differential returns to education, and conflict intensity. Murshed and Gates 2005 using a 'gap' measure of human development, note strong econometric support for a relationship between regional deprivation and the intensity of the Maoist rebellion across districts of Nepal. A later study by Do and Iyer, 2007 replicates the finding that conflict intensity is related to regional deprivation, although in this case it is measured by the regional poverty rate and the literacy rate. They also indicate that caste polarisation affects conflict intensity.
- It is of course, perceptions which motivate people to action. Kirwin and Cho, investigating perceptions in 17 African countries covered by the Afrobarometer, found that , among other factors, 'group grievances are strongly associated with both popular acceptability of political violence and higher levels of participation in demonstrations' (Kirwin and Cho 2009: 1), defining group grievances as how often a respondent's ethnic group is seen to be treated unfairly by the government.

While the evidence shows that higher HIs are correlated with a higher risk of conflict, not all violent mobilization in high-HI countries is primarily identity-driven, at least in terms of discourse. In some societies 'race/ethnicity' and 'class' are virtually coterminous, that is they are ethnically 'ranked systems' (Horowitz, 1985: 22). In such societies, mobilization by *class*

may alternate or substitute for mobilization by ethnicity. Examples are some of the conflicts in Latin America, such as in Peru and Guatemala.

IIC. Political motivation for civil wars

Apart from specific political events and circumstances, research into longer run political motivations has focussed on three areas: first, the opening of political structures (Tarrow 1984); secondly, the type of regime – whether authoritarian or democratic or somewhere in between – the ‘in between’ state being clearly related to the opening of political structures; and thirdly, the inclusiveness of the political system, in design and in practice.

The political system: political crisis and change

The opening of political structures – through revolution, external wars, or coups, gives rise to intense political competition and potentially to civil war. ‘Changing opportunities and constraints... provide the openings that lead resource-poor actors to engage in contentious politics’. (Tarrow 1998:20)

Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010 Investigate this statistically taking ‘irregular’ transitions as a measure of such opening. They find ‘strong support to the claim that political opportunities, as measured by irregular political leader changes, indeed appear to be associated with civil war onset.’ (308).

Regime type

Classifying regimes on a continuum between autocracy and democracy, considerable evidence has accumulated that countries with ‘intermediate regimes’ (neither completely authoritarian nor completely democratic) have the highest propensity to conflict (Bunce 2004 ; de Nardo 1985; Francisco 1995.; Muller and Weede 1990). ‘Coherent democracies and harshly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes are the most conflict-prone’ (Hegre et al; 17). This is not surprising since authoritarian regimes can suppress potential conflict, while established democracies generally have ways of settling disputes peacefully. Moreover, political transition from one regime to another offers a

particular opening in which conflict is most likely to occur which is additional to the impact of intermediate regimes as such (Hegre et al 2001).

The political system: constitutional design

It has been forcibly argued that a federal constitution offers a ‘federal bargain’ which allows regions and ethnic groups relative autonomy and is consequently likely to be less conflict prone than unitary ones because of the power-sharing involved (Riker 1964) . On the other hand, federalism has been blamed for separatist conflicts in Nigeria (Biafra), the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia (Bunce 2004 ; Diprose 2009). Similarly, it is argued that decentralisation (within unitary states) is likely to reduce conflict , but others suggest that decentralisation may reduce conflict at the national level, but increase it at the local level (McGarry and O’Leary 2009; Bakke and Wibbels 2006; Schneider and Wiesehomeir 2008; Green 2008). In Indonesia, for example, the competition for political office in the ethnically and religiously diverse districts of areas such as Sulawesi and Maluku was a driving factor in the emergence of communal conflicts during democratisation (Wimmer, et al. 2009; Brown 2010; Brancati 2006; Diprose 2009); Yet in the same country, decentralisation (and democratisation) seems to have contributed to the ending of separatist conflicts in Aceh and Papua New Guinea.

Systematic empirical evidence on the impact of federalism and decentralisation on conflict propensity is somewhat ambiguous. Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) find that ‘controlling for the presence of the ethnic structure of a country, more inclusive arrangements pacify intrastate relations’ (p198). Federalism can reduce conflict propensity, but much depends on its design. (Bakke and Wibbels (2006) conclude that ‘co-partisanship’ between central and sub-national governments, which implies shared political power (regionally) and consequently lower political HIs, significantly reduces the chance of conflict. ⁶ Decentralisation of power to local levels within a unitary state has been argued to reduce national level conflicts, but often at the expense of increasing local level ones (Green 2008; Diprose 2009; Tranchant 2008).

⁶ Suberu (2009) shows how federalism in Nigeria has contributed to solving difficult and potentially conflict-provoking issues.

Empirical research suggests that the design of federal systems is critical. Nigeria presents a case in point. The initial (five state) federalism, with boundaries drawn broadly around ethnic groups was conflict-creating rather than reducing, but after the end of the Biafran war, a new constitution created many more states, designed to cross ethnic boundaries, and at the same time introduced explicit rules for power-sharing at the central level. Since then there has been no national level conflict, but there remain recurring local conflicts. There is some evidence too that 'Federal systems are typically more stable where there is a *Staatsvolk* ('a national or ethnic people who are demographically or electorally dominant': McGarry and O'Leary 2009; Brown 2010). Other important features of stable federations include power-sharing at the central level (as in Nigeria).

Taking these qualifications into account, in general it seems that federalism and decentralisation tend to be conflict-reducing compared with centralised unitary constitutional design.

Political Horizontal Inequalities and political exclusion

Exclusion from political power leads to protest and often – where there is no way of overcoming this exclusion – to violent conflict. As noted earlier, political horizontal inequalities are an important dimension of horizontal inequalities. When there are political HIs leaders of groups have strong motives to mobilise, since they are excluded from power. This also acts as an incentive for followers who will tend to receive fewer benefits from the state if their leaders are excluded from power. Research suggests that political HIs (or political exclusion) as such raises the risk of civil wars; and the risk is especially high if there are both political and socio-economic HIs because where there are high political HIs leaders have a motive to mobilise people, while where there are large socio-economic HIs the mass of the population in the deprived group are more likely to join any military rebellion. Conversely, where political HIs favour one group and socio-economic one another, conflict is less likely since the potential leadership of the economically deprived group is incorporated in power, and may, indeed, take action to correct the socio-economic inequalities. Malaysia presents an example.

The data limitations on political HIs are even more severe than for socio-economic. However, cross-country empirical investigations support these conclusions:

- (Cederman, et al. 2010; Wimmer, et al. 2009) compiled a global data base for 1946–2005 and show that countries with high degrees of political exclusion are more likely to experience armed conflict.
- (Cederman, et al. 2010; Østby 2008), confirm this finding, showing that political HIs (defined as exclusion from political power of major groups) *adds* to economic HIs in raising the risk of conflict.
- (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999)Østby, however, does not find an independent influence of her measure of political exclusion⁷ and conflict onset, but she finds a strong interaction effect between HIs in regional assets and political exclusion with a rise in the likelihood of conflict, for a given level of HIs, if there is political exclusion (Østby 2008)

All econometric investigation of the determinants of conflicts finds that having had a conflict in the recent past increases the likelihood of a new conflict emerging (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999; Collier and World Bank. 2003; Staub 1989). This appears to be partly due to the fact that the factors which contributed to the initial conflict continue to be present. But this seems to be only part of the explanation – having had a conflict, as one might expect, makes future conflict more likely by hardening divisions and generating revenge motives.

To summarise: as far as socio-economic motives are concerned, the evidence indicates that low incomes per capita, a recent fall in per capita incomes, proportionately large petroleum resources, and high horizontal inequalities raise the risk of conflict, while countries that have a large population of young people are more at risk.

Political conditions that raise the risk of civil war include being in a state of political transition where the ‘opportunity structure’ is open; in an intermediate regime (neither thoroughly authoritarian nor an established democracy), and having an exclusionary political system especially if combined with socio-economic inequalities. Federalism and decentralisation tends to reduce the risk of conflict. And conflict risk is higher if there has been a previous conflict in the recent past.

⁷ Defined according to the nature of the political system, not by evidence on actual exclusion as in Wimmer et al. 2009; and Cederman et al. 2010.

Globalization as a constraint or cause of civil war?

There are conflicting arguments (Barberi and Reuveny 2005): on the one hand, some argue that globalisation enhances development and this in turn reduces the risk of conflict (World Bank 2002); it also may reduce the size of the state and thus reduce the benefits of state takeover : Snyder 1999; it may increase international communication and preventative action by the international community: Goodwin 2001. On the other hand, it is argued that globalisation contributes to rising inequality: Held et al. 1999; and also provides finance for both governments and rebels: Duffield 2001. Econometric investigation by Barbieri and Reuveny suggests that flows of trade and investment have no significant impact on conflict onset, but they are negatively associated with conflict presence. This suggests that causality may go from conflict to trade and investment rather than the other way round.

III. Empirical research into the determinants of genocide

There is, of course, a vast literature on genocide and its causes, much of it investigating particular episodes, exploring historical antecedents and trying to understand and explain the psychology of mass killings. Indeed, some have argued that genocide is so appalling and so strange that each episode needs to be understood as such, and no generalisations can be made. However, there have been increasing attempts to identify common patterns. According to Harff 'All cases have unique properties but also share some discernible patterns with others from which social scientists can identify some common sequences and outcomes' (Harff 1992: 30, quoted in Easterly et al, 2006). Here I shall focus on studies exploring common causes, and especially econometric/statistical exercises that attempt to uncover some of the common patterns across countries, akin to the literature surveyed above in relation to civil wars. Again I differentiate demographic , socio-economic and political factors.

IIIa. Demography

Genocides commonly occur in 'plural' societies, i.e. societies containing distinct ethnic or religious groups. Indeed, the UN definition of genocide -- 'to destroy, in whole or part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group' -- implies the existence of more than one group. However, if one extends the definition to class killings and politically motivated ones, such events may, in principle, occur in fairly homogeneous societies . Thus much of the Soviet

killing in the first half of the twentieth century was class-based, not ethnic; and in Cambodia in the late 1970s, again it was class that formed the basis for mass-killing, although it has been claimed that there as some ethnic element (Kiernan 2007). In contrast to the civil war literature, there seems to have been little reference to the age composition of the population, though some have suggested, in relation to particular cases, that economic difficulties, including high youth unemployment may be a predisposing condition(Rummel 1995).

(Bae and Ott 2008; Rummel 1995) found no relationship between ethnic (or religious) diversity and the onset of democides⁸. Harff (2003) investigated whether genocide was more likely with numerous distinct groups, or the existence of a small minority in otherwise homogenous societies. She found no relationship between demographic composition and the incidence of genocide, independently of political and economic cleavages between groups . Easterly et al. 2006 find a quadratic relationship between ethnic fractionalisation and the incidence of mass killings in a (probit) equation including the level of GDP per capita and the extent of democracy. However, the impact of ethnic fractionalisation disappears disappears in a subsequent tobit analysis. Taken as a whole these investigations suggest little independent influence of demographic composition and the incidence of genocide or mass killings. These findings are broadly similar to the findings about civil war.

III b Economic sources of genocide

In the manifold classifications of genocide, some include a specific economic objective, and thus implicitly an economic motive. For example, Dadrian defines utilitarian genocide (one of four types) as using mass killings in order to obtain control over economic resources; Fein describes ‘developmental genocide’ (also one of four types) where the perpetrator destroys peoples who stand in their way in relation to the exploitation of resources; Smith also refers to utilitarian genocide , which is motivated by material gain, and includes colonial killings and post-colonial developments devastating aboriginal groups. Chalk and Jonassohn differentiate motives for genocide, one (of four again) being to acquire economic wealth.

These motives are akin to the rent-seeking motives argued to underly the motives of many (particularly leaders) in mobilising for civil wars. In line with this, (Valentino 2000)Bae and

⁸ Rummel (1995), 3-4, uses this term to denote ‘intentional killing of people by the government’ including not only group-based killings (defined as genocides) but also ‘starving civilians to death by a blockade; assassinating supposed sympathisers of antigovernment guerrillas; purposely creating a famine; executing prisoners of war; shooting political opponents; or murdering by quota’

Ott (2008) argue that mass killings (not specifically genocide) are motivated by the leaders' expectations of gain.

Again, in common with some findings on civil war, some have pointed to economic depression as predisposing to genocide (Midlarsky 2005)(Valentino 2000). For example, in the German holocaust, the depression of the 1920s and 1930s was an important factor behind Hitler's popularity, and thus an indirect cause of the genocide.

While almost all research on civil war shows that the incidence is higher the lower the national per capita income, this does not appear to be the case for genocide (or mass killings).⁹ As can be seen from Figure 2, the frequency is similar across the first three quartiles, and drops off markedly only in the top quartile of country GDP per capita. However, according to Easterly et al, the average number of victims does fall as GDP per capita rises. They suggest there is 'an inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita incomes and killings' with killing peaking at per capita income of \$1,300' (Easterly et al, 2006:143). Wayman and Tago find that per capita income (proxied by per capita energy use) is not significantly related to democide, but is (negatively) to politicide, but they do not test a quadratic relationship.

⁹ Easterly, Gatti and Sergio (2006) use the term mass killings to denote 'the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims.' (quoted from Charny 1999: 7).




Figure 2: Mass killing frequency (no. of events per decade) at different quartiles of development (log GDP per capita).

Source Easterly et al. 2006.

A common explanation, particularly associated with Kuper, is the existence of social cleavages: ‘Social cleavages are defined variously with reference to unusually deep ethnic, cultural, religious or class divisions, high levels of overt or de facto discrimination, political or economic exclusion and distrust or hatred between groups.’ (Valentino: 8). ‘Social cleavages polarize ‘society, increasing the likelihood of intergroup conflict’ (Valentino: 9). This view combines distinct factors – both economic and political inequalities among groups *and* a high state of distrust between them.

Social cleavages then encompass Horizontal inequalities which are risk factors for civil war, as noted above. Some scholars of genocide have adopted a dynamic approach to inequalities – I.e, that the *changing* position of particular groups during modernisation is a factor ((Krain 1997; Melson 1989; Melson 1992) Midlarsky 2005). This is in tune with Gurr’s notion of relative deprivation applied to rebellions which includes deprivation relative to expectations (Gurr 1970).

The second element in the definition - ‘distrust or hatred between groups’ is also present in the civil war literature, but in that literature rather than taking it as a given independent determinant of conflict, research has been devoted to the underlying causes, including contact between groups (Allport 1954; Varshney 2002); inequalities between groups which can create distrust; or past conflict. Some argue that such distrust or hatred is as much a consequence as a cause of conflict (Kalyvas). It has been argued that in genocide too, the distrust and hatred is created instrumentally by leaders who have strategic motives (economic or political) (Valentino 2000) rather than being an independent cause. The existence of a ‘genocidal ideology’ is a common finding from genocide studies (Kuper 1981; Hirsch and Smith 1988) often brought about by conscious demonising of the other – which also occurs in and prior to many civil wars.

III.c. Political

State crises and political upheaval.

A number of scholars have argued that genocide frequently coincides with major political upheavals – defined by Harff as ‘an abrupt change in the political community caused by the formation of a state or regime through violent conflict, redrawing of state boundaries or defeat in international war’ (Harff 2003: 62). In such situations, new (previously subordinate) groups come to power, and/ or there is uncertainty and competition for power. Such upheavals are said to provide ‘political opportunity structures’ for genocide to occur ((Harff 1987)Krain 1997), which may be associated with external wars, civil wars, decolonisation and extra-constitutional changes.

- For example, Melson (1989) analysing the Armenian genocide and the German Holocaust argued that in each case revolutions brought new classes (with a genocidal ideology) to power, and that wartime conditions facilitated genocide, making it easier to conceal.
- Midlarsky (2005) analysing twentieth century genocides argues that genocide is more likely during war .
- Levene (2005) suggests that genocides are more likely during ‘systemic crises’ faced by new states.

The view that crises and changes in the political system provide the conditions for genocide is consistent with the strand in the civil war literature, noted earlier, arguing that civil war is more likely during political transition and crisis.

Statistical investigations have found that the level of upheaval ((Wayman and Tago 2010)Harff 1997;2003) is significantly related to the incidence of genocide. Indeed, Harff finds that ‘all but one of 37 genocides and politicides that began between 1955 and 1998 occurred during or immediately after political upheavals’ (Harff 2003: 62) making such upheaval a necessary but not sufficient condition for genocide to occur. This is a much stronger condition than the findings in relation to civil war. Easterly et al. 2006 find that ongoing civil war is a significant correlate of genocide in all their specifications , after allowing for the impact of GDP per capita and the extent of democracy. This is also a finding of Krain 1997. Krain also finds that the combined effect of the simultaneous presence of both internal and external wars is much greater than either alone. Akindès (forthcoming) and Wayman and Tago (2010) also find that the presence of civil war is significantly and positively related to the incidence of both ‘democide’ and ‘politicide’¹⁰, and so (independently) are coups.

Regime type

Concentration of power is argued to be a precondition of genocide, with authoritarian governments most likely to commit genocide and democracies least likely:

- ‘The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic subjects. The more constrained the power of governments, the less it will aggress on others.’ (Rummel 1994: 1-2).
- ‘The best way to account for and to predict democide is by the degree to which a regime is totalitarian along a democratic-totalitarian scale.’ (Rummel 1995: 25).

Statistical investigations show that regime type is, indeed, generally associated with genocide:

¹⁰ ‘democide’ are mass killings and data are derived from Rummel 1995, while ‘politicide’ data are derived from Harff 2003 and refers to ‘geno-politicide’; the latter refers to killings with specific intent against particular groups, while the former is a broader data set referring to any deliberate mass. Killings. (Wayman and Tago 2010 : 4).

- Fein 1993, 2000 finds that totalitarian states are most likely to commit genocides and that genocide is more likely to be committed by revolutionary and authoritarian states than democratic ones.
- Harff 2003, 2009 finds that the presence of an autocratic government increases the likelihood of genocide.
- Easterly et al 2006 find that the extent of democracy is significantly and (inversely) related to the incidence of mass killings.
- In contrast, Wayman and Tago 2010 conclude that ‘important regime effects either appear or disappear depending in the data set used, with regime type generally having a significant effect on the onset of democide but not having a significant effect on onset of geno-politicide’ (p 3) and ‘autocratic regimes, especially communist, are prone to mass killing generally, but not so strongly inclined (i.e. not statistically significantly inclined) toward geno-politicide’ (p 13).

There is a contrast here in the findings with respect to civil war and to genocide. In the former, it is intermediate regimes which are most prone to violence. But with genocide, autocratic governments dominate.

Constitutional design

The concentration of power which is argued to be associated with genocide¹¹ depends not only on regime type but also constitutional checks and balances and the extent of decentralisation. However, there tends to be a strong association between autocracy and concentration of power and there have been very few attempts to separate them in investigating associations with genocide. One such is Krain 1997 who uses a Polity II measure of power concentration. He finds no independent influence on the determinants of genocide in most of his models.

Marginality from the world system

Other countries governments’ may potentially act as a check on genocide. Consequently, marginality in the world system has been argued to be relevant – on the basis that there will be less international checks in such a situation (Gurr 1994, 359). However, there is

¹¹ ‘the more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic subjects. The more constrained the power of governments, the less ti will aggress on others’ (Rummel 1994: 1-2).

conflicting evidence on this. Harff 2003 finds evidence that genocide probability is greater the lower a country's ratio of exports plus imports to GDP; but Krain 1997, who measures marginality as exports plus imports of a country as a proportion of world exports, plus imports finds no association.

Political exclusion and dominance

Political exclusion is an important cause of civil war, especially when such exclusion occurs on lines of identity. Consistent with this, in the case of genocide Kuper argues that genocide is most likely to occur in a plural society 'in its extreme form ... by a superimposition of inequalities' (Kuper, 1981: 58), in which one ethnoclass rules over a subordinate ethnoclass. i.e. as in the case of horizontal inequalities and civil war, where socio-economic inequalities between ethnic groups coincide with political dominance.

Helen Fein has argued that political exclusion and political discrimination on the basis of ethnic hierarchy is a factor conducive to genocide. Fein (1993) shows a high probability of states with high 'discrimination or exclusion of an ethnoclass '. Similarly, Harff (2003) found that the presence of a dominant ethnic group together with an exclusionary ideology raise the risk of genocide.

IV. Civil war and genocide findings: a comparison

The conclusions from this review of findings in the two cases are brought together in Table 1:

Contributory factors	Civil war	Genocide/politicide/democide/mass killings
Demography		
Fractionalisation	Little evidence as an independent factor, but most conflict at intermediate levels of fractionalisation	same
High proportion of youth	Correlation, probably associated with lack of	Not investigated

	employment opportunities	
Economic factors		
Economic stagnation	Argued, little evidence	Same
Low national per capita incomes	Strong evidence that raises risks	Intermediate levels of per capita income more risky
Rent-seeking opportunities	Argued, but evidence not strong	Same
Horizontal inequalities	Strong evidence of association	Suggested and some evidence but not investigated very systematically
Political factors		
Opportunity structure and political upheaval	Strongly argued and some evidence, including irregular transitions	Systematic evidence, including ongoing civil war
Regime type	Most incidence in 'intermediate' regimes and regimes in transition	Most incidence in authoritarian regimes
Constitutional design: checks and balances and decentralisation	Some (mixed) evidence that more decentralisation reduces conflict propensity	No evidence
Marginality from the world system	No association with conflict onset, but greater global integration associated with lower probability of conflict presence. Direction of causality in question.	Some evidence shows that more marginality increases conflict and other evidence shows no relationship
Political horizontal inequalities/political exclusion	Strong evidence especially if associated with socio-economic inequalities	Evidence from case histories and some econometric evidence
History of past	Strong statistical evidence	Strong statistical evidence (not

conflict/genocide	(not summarised above)	summarised above)
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Three major differences between civil war and genocide are apparent from the Table:

1. While countries with low per capita incomes present high risks for civil war, it is intermediate levels of income that are most strongly associated with genocide.
2. Autocratic/totalitarian regimes are most likely to initiate genocide, while intermediate regimes are most likely to be associated with civil wars.
3. A major disposing condition for genocide is the existence of civil war, which obviously is not the case for the onset of conflict.

There are also some similarities between the conditions which give rise to civil war and genocide:

1. In both cases a past history of civil war/genocide is a predisposing condition.
2. In neither case, are demographic factors – in particular the ethnic composition of the population - strongly associated with either condition; but in both cases, it seems that the mid-range of ELF (or having a few large groups) is statistically most dangerous. However, in the case of genocide it seems that a relatively small group is often the target or, when in government the initiator of the slaughter.
3. In both cases, horizontal inequalities between salient groups - in either economic or political dimensions - raise the risk of conflict, and the risks seem to rise where the two occur simultaneously, but the evidence for economic inequalities is more limited for genocides, and more research is needed on this.

V. Policy conclusions

It is sometimes argued – vis-à-vis- civil wars – that we cannot always assume that their effects are totally negative. While civil wars have many well known adverse effects of human wellbeing and the economy (Collier and World Bank 2003; Stewart 2001). In some cases violence may be the only way of achieving political change in very adverse political conditions; and they may release social and economic constraints and lead to some improvements (e.g. with respect to the role of women). In contrast, genocides appear to be purely evil, with totally negative effects. This contrast is relevant when it comes to policy, particularly for external actors. In general, while the aim should be to prevent conflicts and

genocides, prevention of genocide has absolute priority. When it comes to civil war one needs to consider first what the war is about – it might indeed even be about *preventing* genocide.

Policies to prevent genocide

Since civil war itself is one of the predisposing conditions which can give rise to genocide, policies which effectively prevent civil war should also contribute to the prevention of genocide. Moreover, many of the policies that are likely to prevent civil war also are likely to reduce the risk of genocide.

Countries at risk of genocidal episodes in the near future are likely to be authoritarian, centralised, with very few checks on power; and they are likely to exclude significant groups in society from power and from fair terms with respect to economic and social resources. In such situations, the government in power is almost certainly *not* amenable to the sort of policy change likely to make conflict and genocide less likely. The policies to be considered here are then more likely to be acted upon in (and relevant to) ‘normal’ countries, not yet of the extreme type just described. The hope is in such normal times, good policies are instituted which then prevent countries falling into conflict or becoming genocidal. In countries already on the brink of civil war or worse, more short-term emergency action may be needed.

Socio-economic policies

1. Economic Growth and fluctuations

For civil war, increasing per capita income reduces the risks. This does not seem to be the case for genocide where risks are highest at intermediate levels of per capita income. However, analysts of both civil war and genocide agree that for any level of income slumps tend to raise risks; and both agree that high youth unemployment does too. Hence policies that avoid major fluctuations in economic activity and which are employment creating are likely to be helpful. In practice, recent economic history shows a poor record on both; and on both there are known policy remedies that could be adopted. These include global and domestic schemes to insulate the economy from global fluctuations – arising from fluctuations in commodity prices and financial flows; countercyclical aid and government expenditure; and a variety of employment schemes (Stewart 2011).

2. *Inclusive socio-economic policies*

The most important set of socio-economic policies to prevent conflict and genocide are those directed towards reducing socio-economic HIs. A major source of support for violent mobilisation is a sense of unfairness in the allocation of resources across groups – particularly those directly controlled by the government. Policies to correct this include balanced regional investments; anti-discrimination laws; monitoring of all government contracts and government employment and taking action (including if necessary affirmative action) to correct inequalities¹². While these policies are essential, they can also be provocative if introduced insensitively. The groups that lose can resist, even violently, if action is taken too rapidly and without securing national support. Yet leaving major inequalities, including cases where minority groups are considerably richer than the rest of the society, (like Jews in pre-war Germany or Tutsis in Rwanda), as well as cases where the groups are much poorer (like indigenous peoples in Guatemala or Peru) risks civil war and even genocide.

3. *Equality of cultural recognition.* Inequalities in cultural recognition can provoke resentment and bind people together as a group. They may also be a source of economic and political inequalities. For example, in Sri Lanka, the recognition of Sinhalese as a national language and not Tamil or English (spoken by the Tamils) was a source of immense resentment among the Tamils and also a cause of unemployment among the Tamils who did not speak enough Sinhalese to get government jobs. Recognition and respect for the cultural rights of different groups in society is important to reduce intergroup hostility as well as contributing to greater socio-economic equality. This includes treatment of language, religious practices and cultural practices and behaviour.

4. *The ideology of hatred.* It is commonly argued that some genocidal episodes exhibit genocidal ideologies, which include the idea that the target group is subhuman and potentially contaminating (Fein 1983; Smith 1987; Harff 2003). This type of ideology may be assumed by leaders instrumentally, as an effective

¹² A full discussion of policies to correct HIs is to be found in Stewart (2008), Chapter 14.

way of mobilising support; it is then deliberately propagated to the mass of the population, systematically and over a prolonged period. This type of education for hatred is not confined to genocidal situations but is also to be found prior to and during civil wars (Akindès (forthcoming).) Making this type of hate propagation illegal is an important element in any preventative policy (Stewart and Brown 2007) (World 2002). Monitoring such activities may also be useful in providing early warning indicators of violent mobilisation.

Political policies

1. *Inclusive government.* In the political realm, a critical requirement both for preventing civil war and genocide, is that governments are *inclusive* in multiethnic and multireligious societies. This sounds a very obvious and commonsense requirement. Yet it is not part of the structure of majoritarian democratic systems, nor is it built into the constitutions of most multiethnic countries. A majoritarian, winner takes all democracy is liable to exclude minorities (even sizeable minorities) from political power. This exclusion may lead minorities to seek power by force; and may lead majorities to suppress and even aim to eliminate minorities. An example of this is the situation leading to the Rwandan genocide, when Tutsis were excluded from power by the Hutu majority, and the violent reactions of Tutsis (from their base in Uganda) was a reason (or excuse) for the genocide.

Inclusive governments can occur through informal convention (as in Ghana) or through formal consociational arrangements (as for example in Lebanon and Bosnia) where major groups have constitutional rights to a share of the government jobs; or through some combination of formal and informal, as in Nigeria. Each of these solutions can be supported by voting systems which encourage power-sharing (like proportional representation) and by measures of decentralisation. There are disadvantages to most types of formal power-sharing – for example, the ethnicisation of politics and, often, the exclusion of small groups (as has occurred in Nigeria). Yet reliance on informal convention may not be enough, since such conventions can readily be overthrown : an example is Cote d'Ivoire where Houphouët-Boigny followed an inclusive, albeit authoritarian policy, which successfully sustained peace,

but exclusive policies adopted by his successors led to civil war and may lead to mass killings.

A strong international norm in favour of inclusivity needs to be accepted and promoted (for developed as well as developing countries). This is more important than the much vaunted advocacy of democracy for multiethnic societies.

2. *Checks to executive power.* Unbridled power allows governments to initiate genocidal action, especially under the cover of civil war which can dilute both internal and external checks. Examples can be drawn from across the world - in Europe, Germany; in Latin America, Guatemala; in Asia, Cambodia; and in Africa, Rwanda. In such situations, the executive controls the media, the police, the law, and above all the army; opposition is suppressed and those who resist are killed. The government may keep killing at arms length by employing (and paying for) militias. Checks to executive power can be built into the constitution, dividing power between Executive and the Legislative, establishing an independent judiciary and freedom of the media. All these things can, of course, be overturned by ruthless leaders. But establishing them in 'normal' times and building up a strong norms and traditions in their favour may prevent such action, or at least make it more difficult.
3. *Human Rights.* Human Rights conventions also need to be incorporated into countries' constitutions so that people have legal entitlements and redress. The institution of Ombudsman can help poor groups to claim their rights, as is beginning to occur in Peru (Pegram 2011). International Human Rights agreements provide an opening for external monitoring and indeed interventions when such rights are flouted.
4. *Regime type.* While the worst types of regimes are authoritarian ones, from the perspective of preventing genocide, 'intermediate' regimes are worst in terms of risks of civil war. Often elections, during a transition from an authoritarian regime, are the occasion for the outbreak of war – with Cote d'Ivoire as an example. Authoritarian regimes can suppress and prevent violent opposition; countries in transition have lost this power of suppression, and yet not gained the traditions of respect for democratic processes that (usually) allow for unproblematic transfer of power in the advanced countries. Moreover, the nature of politics and power in poorer multiethnic societies mean that securing power (or losing it) has strong implications for particular groups.

Groups gain jobs/contracts and other privileges when their leaders are in power and lose them when not : this ethnicises politics and makes it especially difficult for losing groups to accept democratic decisions.

This presents a dilemma: should countries stick with authoritarian regimes thereby reducing the risk of civil war; or proceed to intermediate regimes, where the risk of civil war rises but that of genocide falls (albeit having a civil war is another major risk factor for genocide)? The answer probably lies in the nature of the transition. Ultimately, established democracy is the best system from the perspective of both civil wars and genocide, and to get there from authoritarian regimes undoubtedly requires a transition. But much more caution is needed than hitherto in terms of the nature of the transition. Norms of inclusion and of respect for human rights, for checks and balances and diffusion of power are far more important than the multiparty democracy beloved of the West and should precede the institution of democratic processes rather than assume (falsely) that they will follow automatically once 'democratic' institutions are in place.

VI. Conclusions.

This paper has reviewed and contrasted research into the root causes of civil war and of genocide. There are some important areas in common in the conditions liable to cause these two deadly events, notably exclusive political and socio-economic policies and outcomes as well as a history of previous such events. But there are some differences: civil wars tend to be higher in low income countries and in intermediate regimes, whereas genocides tend to be higher in low and middle income countries and in authoritarian regimes. Both, however, are more common during political upheaval and transition. In the case of genocides, civil wars themselves are one important predisposing condition. Hence policies to prevent civil wars may also contribute to preventing genocide.

Once a situation has evolved in which there are high risks or actual episodes, any policy advice about preventative action is likely to fall on deaf ears. What is important is that appropriate policies should be in place in every multiethnic society to avoid a high risk situation emerging.

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